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SELECTION TO THE KANSAS SUPREME COURT
Stephen J. Ware
Kansas is the only state in the union that gives the members of its bar 
majority control over the selection of state supreme court justices.  The bar 
consequently may have more control over the judiciary in Kansas than in any 
other state.  This process for selecting justices to the Kansas Supreme Court is 
described by the organized bar as a “merit,” rather than political, process.  
Other observers, however, emphasize that the process has a political side as 
well.  This paper surveys debate about possible reforms to the Kansas Supreme 
Court selection process.  These reforms would reduce the amount of control 
exercised by the bar and establish a more public system of checks and 
balances.
I. BAR CONTROL
The Supreme Court Nominating Commission is at the center of judicial 
selection in Kansas.1  When there is a vacancy on the Kansas Supreme Court, 
the Nominating Commission assesses applicants and submits its three favorites 
to the Governor.2  The Governor must pick one of the three nominees and that 
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draft of this paper from Steve McAllister and Lance Kinzer.  Finally, I thank the Federalist 
Society for commissioning this paper.  The author is responsible for all views expressed herein.
1. KAN. CONST. art. 3 § 5.  See also KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 20-119 to -125 (2006).
2. The Kansas Constitution provides that:
(a) Any vacancy occurring in the office of any justice of the supreme court and 
any position to be open thereon as a result of enlargement of the court, or the 
retirement or failure of an incumbent to file his declaration of candidacy to 
succeed himself as hereinafter required, or failure of a justice to be elected to 
succeed himself, shall be filled by appointment by the governor of one of three 
persons possessing the qualifications of office who shall be nominated and whose 
names shall be submitted to the governor by the supreme court nominating 
commission established as hereinafter provided.
(b) In event of the failure of the governor to make the appointment within sixty 
days from the time the names of the nominees are submitted to him, the chief 
justice of the supreme court shall make the appointment from such nominees. 
KAN. CONST. art. 3 § 5(a), (b).
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person is thereby appointed a justice on the Kansas Supreme Court,3 without 
any further checks on the power of the Commission.  Therefore, the 
Commission is the gatekeeper to the Kansas Supreme Court.  The bar (lawyers 
licensed to practice in the state) has majority control over this gatekeeper.  The 
Commission consists of nine members, five selected by the bar and four 
selected by the Governor.4
No other state in the union gives its bar majority control over its supreme 
court nominating commission.  Kansas stands alone at one extreme on the 
continuum from more to less bar control of supreme court selection.  Closest to 
Kansas on this continuum are the eight states in which the bar selects a 
minority of the nominating commission but this minority is only one vote short 
of a majority.5  In these eight states, members of the commission not selected 
by the bar are selected in a variety of ways.  Six of them include a judge (and a 
seventh includes two judges) on the nominating commission.  In six of these 
eight states, as in Kansas, all the non-lawyer members of the commission are 
selected by the governor, while in two of these states the governor’s selections 
are subject to confirmation by the legislature.
3. If the Governor does not pick one of the three, which has never happened, the duty to 
pick one of the three falls to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. Id.
4. The Kansas Constitution provides that:
The supreme court nominating commission shall be composed as follows: One 
member, who shall be chairman, chosen from among their number by the 
members of the bar who are residents of and licensed in Kansas; one member 
from each congressional district chosen from among their number by the resident 
members of the bar in each such district; and one member, who is not a lawyer, 
from each congressional district, appointed by the governor from among the 
residents of each such district.
KAN. CONST. art. 3 § 5(e).  As Kansas currently has four congressional districts, the Commission 
currently has nine members.  The term of office for each member of the commission is “for as 
many years as there are, at the time of their election or appointment, congressional districts in the 
state.” KAN. STAT. ANN. § 20-125.
5. See ALASKA CONST. art. IV, §§ 5, 8 (commission consists of 7 members: chief justice, 
three lawyers appointed for six-year terms by the governing body of the organized bar, three non-
lawyers appointed for six-year terms by the governor subject to confirmation by legislature); IND.
CONST. of 1851, art. VII, §§ 9−10 (1970); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 33-27-2-2, -2-1 (LexisNexis 2007) 
(7 members: chief justice; 3 lawyers, 1 from each court of appeals district, elected by members of 
the bar association in each district; 3 nonlawyers, 1 from each court of appeals district, appointed 
by governor); IOWA CONST. of 1857, art. V, § 16 (1962); IOWA CODE §§ 46.1−.2, .15 (2006) (15 
members: chief justice; 7 lawyers elected by members of bar association, 7 nonlawyers appointed 
by governor and confirmed by senate); MO. CONST. of 1945, art. V, § 25(a)-(d) (1976); MO. SUP.
CT. R. 10.03 (7 members: 1 supreme court judge chosen by members of court; 3 lawyers elected 
by members of bar; 3 nonlawyers appointed by governor); NEB. CONST. of 1875, art. V, § 21 
(1972); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-801−24-812 (LexisNexis 2007) (9 members: chief judge, 4 
lawyers elected by members of bar association, 4 nonlawyers appointed by governor); OKLA.
CONST. art. VII-B, § 3 (13 members: 6 lawyers elected by members of bar, 6 nonlawyers 
appointed by governor and 1 nonlawyer elected by other members); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 16-
1A-2 (2007) (7 members: 3 lawyers appointed by president of bar, 2 circuit judges elected by 
judicial conference, and 2 nonlawyers appointed by governor); WYO. CONST. art. V, § 4; WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 5-1-102 (2007) (7 members: chief justice, 3 lawyers elected by members of bar, 3 
nonlawyers appointed by governor).
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In sum, nine states allow the bar to select some of the commission’s 
members and Kansas is the only state in which the bar selects a majority of the 
commission.  By contrast,  forty one states either give the bar no official power 
in the initial6 selection of supreme court justices or balance the bar’s role with 
power exercised by publicly-elected officials.  For example, in Colorado the 
bar has no role in selecting the nominating commission.7  In three states, the 
bar’s role is limited to merely suggesting names for a minority of the 
commission and those suggested do not become commissioners unless 
approved by the governor and/or legislature.8
Fifteen states divide the power to appoint supreme court justices among 
several publicly-elected officials rather than concentrating this power in the 
governor.  In two of these states justices are appointed by the legislature.9  In 
thirteen of these states (ten with a nominating commission10) the governor 
6. In some states, interim vacancies (that occur during a justice’s uncompleted term) are 
filled in a different manner from initial vacancies.  See Judicial Selection in the States, 
http://www.ajs.org/js/select.htm (last visited Aug. 16, 2007).  Several states that use elections to 
fill initial vacancies use nominating commissions to fill interim vacancies.  Id.
7. COLO. CONST. art. VI, §§ 20, 24 (15 voting members: 7 lawyers appointed through 
majority action of governor, attorney general, and chief justice, 8 nonlawyers appointed by 
governor).
8. See ARIZ. CONST. art. VI, § 36 (16 members: chief justice, 5 lawyers nominated by 
governing body of bar and appointed by governor with advice and consent of senate, 10 
nonlawyers appointed by governor with advice and consent of senate); FLA. CONST. of 1968 art. 
V, § 11 (1998); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 43.291 (LexisNexis 2007) (9 members: 4 lawyers appointed 
by governor from lists of nominees submitted by board of governors of bar association, 5 other 
members appointed by governor with at least 2 being lawyers or members of state bar); TENN.
CODE ANN. §§ 17-4-102, -106, -112 (2007) (17 members: speakers of senate and house each 
appoint 6 lawyers, 12 total, from lists submitted by Tennessee Bar Association (2), Tennessee 
Defense Lawyers Association (1), Tennessee Trial Lawyers Association (3), Tennessee District 
Attorneys General Conference (3), and Tennessee Association for Criminal Defense Lawyers (3); 
the speakers also each appoint 1 lawyer not nominated by an organization, each appoint 1 
nonlawyer, and jointly appoint a third nonlawyer).
9. These states are: South Carolina and Virginia. See Judicial Selection in the States, 
http://www.ajs.org/js/select.htm (last visited Oct. 6, 2007). South Carolina uses a nominating 
commission.   S.C. CONST. art. V, § 27; S.C. CODE ANN. § 2-19-10 (2006) (10 members 
appointed by speaker of house or president of senate, General Assembly may reject all the 
commission’s nominees, but cannot elect a candidate who has not been nominated by 
commission).
10. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12011.5(b) (West 2007) (commission’s “membership . . . shall 
consist of attorney members and public members with the ratio of public members to attorney 
members determined, to the extent practical, by the ratio established in Sections 6013.4 and 
6013.5 of the Business and Professions Code”); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 51-44a (2007) (12 
members: 3 lawyers appointed by governor, 3 nonlawyers appointed by governor, 3 lawyers, 1 
appointed by each senate president, house majority and minority leaders, and 3 nonlawyers, one 
appointed by each of house speaker, senate majority and minority leaders); Del. Exec. Order No. 
4 (Jan. 5, 2001) (9 members: 8 appointed by governor (4 lawyers and 4 nonlawyers) and 1 
appointed by president of bar association, with consent of governor); HAW. CONST. art. VI, §§ 3-
4 (9 members: 2 appointed by governor, 2 by senate president, 2 by house speaker, 1 by chief 
justice, 2 by state bar, no more than 4 members may be lawyers); Md. Exec. Order No. 
01.01.2007.08 (Apr. 27, 2007) (17 members, 12 appointed by governor, 5 by president of bar 
association); Mass. Exec. Order No. 477 (Jan. 12, 2007) (21 members, all appointed by 
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nominates justices but the governor’s nominee does not join the court unless 
confirmed by the legislature11 or other publicly-elected officials.12  Finally, 
twenty-two states elect their supreme court justices.13  The various methods of 
governor); N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 2 (12 members: 4 appointed by governor, 4 by chief judge, 4 
by leaders of legislature); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 8-16.1-2 (2006) (9 members: 3 lawyers and 1 
nonlawyer appointed by governor, governor also appoints 5 additional members from lists 
submitted by leaders of legislature); UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-12-102 (2007) (7 members: chief 
justice or designee of chief justice, 6 members appointed by governor, 2 lawyers appointed by 
governor from list submitted by state bar; no more than 4 lawyers total); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, §§ 
71, 601, 603 (2007) (11 members: 2 nonlawyers appointed by governor; house and senate each 
select 3 members, 2 nonlawyers and 1 lawyer; and 3 lawyers elected by members of bar).
11. See CONN. CONST. art. V, § 2 (legislature); DEL. CONST. of 1897 art. IV, § 3 (1983) 
(senate); HAW. CONST. art. VI, § 3(senate); ME. CONST. art. V, Pt. 1, § 8 (senate); MD. CONST.
art. II, § 10 (senate); N.J. CONST. art. VI, § VI, Para. 1 (senate); N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 2, Para. e 
(senate); R.I. CONST. art. X, § 4 (house and senate); UTAH CONST. art. VIII, § 8 (senate); VT.
CONST. § 32 (senate).
12. Massachusetts and New Hampshire require confirmation by the governor’s council, 
which in Massachusetts consists of the lieutenant governor and eight persons elected biennially, 
MASS. CONST. Pt. 2, Ch. 2, § 1, art. 9; Id. Amend. XVI, and in New Hampshire consists of one 
person elected from each county biennially. N.H. CONST. Pt. 2, art. 46, 60-61.  California’s 
system is unique and experience under it exemplifies the possible consequences of subordinating 
the nominating commission (and thus the bar) to publicly elected officials.   “Although the 
California Constitution provides that judges of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeal are to be 
elected for a twelve-year term (CAL. CONST. art. 6, sec. 16, subd. (a)), the practice is that they are 
appointed by the Governor to fill unexpired terms, and then must go through a non-contested 
retention election.”  Stephen B. Presser et al., The Case for Judicial Appointments, 33 U. TOL. L.
REV. 353, 365 (2002).  See also Rebecca Wiseman, So You Want to Stay a Judge: Name and 
Politics of the Moment May Decide Your Future, 18 J.L. & POL. 643, 646-47 (2002); CAL.
CONST. art. VI, § 16 (retention elections).  Under this practice, the governor’s nominee is
confirmed by a three-person commission made up of the chief justice, the state attorney general, 
and whoever is the most senior presiding justice of the various district Court of Appeals.  CAL.
CONST. art. VI, § 7.  Before this commission can approve the nominee, the governor must submit 
the nominee to the Judicial Nominees Evaluation (JNE) Commission, an agency of the State Bar 
of California.  CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12011.5(a) (West 2007); CAL. ST. B. R.P. 2(2.72).  Until 
1996, no governor had ever nominated an individual ranked unqualified by the JNE.  In that year, 
Governor Pete Wilson, for the first time in JNE's history, disregarded a “not 
qualified” rating and appointed to the California Supreme Court a remarkable 
African-American woman, Janice Brown.  Wilson had previously appointed 
Brown to the Court of Appeal with JNE rating her “qualified” for that position.  
Moreover, she had previously served as Wilson's Legal Affairs Secretary; unlike 
other candidates, Wilson was personally familiar with Brown's legal abilities and 
qualifications. Brown's appointment to the California Supreme Court despite 
JNE's opposition created a furor because she is an outspoken and eloquent 
conservative. JNE's “not qualified” rating was widely perceived as motivated by 
political or ideological considerations.  
Wilson defied JNE twice more as governor, appointing to the Superior Court and 
the Court of Appeal candidates he believed to be well-qualified, even though they 
were rated “not qualified” by JNE.
Presser et al., supra, at 372.  In 2003, President Bush appointed Janice Brown to the United States 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. See 151 CONG. REC. S 6208, 6217 (daily ed. June 
8, 2005).  The Senate voted fifty-six to forty-three in favor of her confirmation.  151 CONG. REC.
S 6208, 6218 (daily ed. June 8, 2005).
13. Seven states use partisan elections: Alabama, Illinois, Louisiana (uses a blanket primary 
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selecting state supreme court justices are summarized in Table 1, which 
follows.
Table 1















































































To recap, more than four-fifths of the states either give the bar no official 
power in the initial selection of supreme court justices or balance the bar’s role 
with power exercised by publicly-elected officials.  These states generally 
select their justices through:
(1) appointment by the legislature,
(2) confirmation of the governor’s nominees by the legislature,14
or
(3) elections in which a lawyer’s vote is worth no more than any other 
citizen’s vote.  
where all candidates appear with party labels on the ballot and the top two vote getters compete in 
the general election), New Mexico, Pennsylvania (if more than one seat is available all candidates 
run at large and the top two vote getters fill the open seats), Texas, and West Virginia. See 
Judicial Selection in the States, http://www.ajs.org/js/select.htm (last visited Oct. 6, 2007).  
Fifteen states use (purportedly) non-partisan elections: Arkansas, Georgia, Idaho, Kentucky, 
Michigan (non-partisan general election, but partisan nomination), Minnesota, Mississippi, 
Montana, Nevada, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio (non-partisan general election, but 
partisan nomination), Oregon, Washington, and Wisconsin.  See id.  With respect to Michigan 
and Ohio, see also Herbert M. Kritzer, Law is the Mere Continuation of Politics by Different 
Means: American Judicial Selection in the Twenty-First Century, 56 DE PAUL L. REV. 423, 456-
60 (2007).
14. Or other publicly-elected officials.
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Less than one-fifth of states allow the bar to select members of a nominating 
commission that has the power to ensure that one of its initial nominees 
becomes a justice.15  And Kansas alone allows the bar to select a majority of 
such a commission.
II. DOES SECRECY YIELD MERIT?
While the President nominates federal judges, these judges are not 
confirmed without a majority vote  of the United States Senate16 and these 
votes on the confirmation of federal judges have long been public.17  In 
contrast, the votes of the Kansas Supreme Court Nominating Commission are 
secret, as are the Commission’s interviews of applicants.18  The public can 
learn of the pool of applicants and the three chosen by the Commission, but 
cannot discover which commissioners voted for or against which applicants.19  
By statute, the Commission “may act only by the concurrence of a majority of 
its members.”20  But no statute requires that the votes of the Commission be 
made public.21
15. The importance of this power was recently demonstrated in Missouri where the 
governor publicly considered the possibility of refusing to appoint any of the three nominees 
submitted to him by the supreme court nominating commission. See Editorial, Blunt Trauma, 
WALL ST. J., Sept. 17, 2007, at A16.  The governor ultimately did appoint one of the nominees 
and his capitulation to the commission has been explained by the fact that if he did not appoint 
one of those three then the commission would exercise its power to appoint one of the three.  Id.  
By contrast, the commission lacks this power to ensure that one of its nominees becomes a justice 
where appointment requires confirmation by the legislature of other publicly-elected officials.  
The body with the power to withhold confirmation has the power to send the commission “back 
to the drawing board” to identify additional nominees if none of the original nominees wins 
confirmation.
16. U.S. CONST. art. II, §2.
17. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5 (“Each House shall keep a Journal of its Proceedings, and from 
time to time publish the same, excepting such Parts as may in their Judgment require Secrecy; 
and the Yeas and Nays of the Members of either House on any question shall, at the Desire of one 
fifth of those Present, be entered on the Journal.”)  “Until 1929 the practice was to consider all 
nominations in closed executive session unless the Senate, by a two-thirds vote taken in closed 
session, ordered the debate to be open.” Paul A. Freund, Appointment of Justices: Some 
Historical Perspectives, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1146, 1157 (1988).  See also JOSEPH P. HARRIS, THE 
ADVICE AND CONSENT OF THE SENATE: A STUDY IN THE CONFIRMATION OF APPOINTMENTS BY 
THE UNITED STATES SENATE 253-55 (1953).
18. Laura Scott, Keep Politics Out of the Selection of Judges, KANS. CITY STAR, Feb. 11, 
2008, at B7.  “That’s troubling, as these are the top positions in the judiciary and the people 
picked for them make decisions that impact many lives.”  Id.
19. Research for this paper found no evidence of any dissenting votes on the Commission or 
of any disagreement on the Commission at all.
20. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 20-123.
21. A 1982 opinion by the Kansas Attorney General concluded “the Supreme Court 
Nominating Commission may conduct its meeting in full public view, however, the legislature is 
without authority to require that meetings of the Commission be open or closed. Nor may the 
legislature require the Commission to meet in a particular place.” XVI Op. Att’y Gen. Kan. 95 
(1982), 1982 WL 187743.  A recent survey of judicial nominating commissions lists Kansas 
among the “five states [that] have no written rules about whether or not commission deliberations 
2- WARE                                                                     (DO NOT DELETE) 5/30/2008  3:38:20 PM
392 KANSAS JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. XVII:3
Defenders of this largely-secret system describe it as “non-partisan” or 
“merit” selection,22 and contend that it selects applicants based on their merits 
rather than their politics.23  There is, however, a remarkable pattern of 
governors appointing to the Commission members of the governor’s political 
party.  Research for this paper examined the twenty-year period from 1987 to 
2007.  During this period, twenty-two people appointed by the governor served 
on the Commission.  In all twenty-two cases, the governor appointed a member 
of the governor’s party.24  This is depicted in Table 2, which follows.
will be confidential, and [the] seven states [that] have no written rules that govern whether 
commission voting will be confidential.” Rachel Paine Caufield, How the Pickers Pick: Finding a 
Set of Best Practices for Judicial Nominating Commission, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 163, 184 & 
n.118 (2007).
22. See, e.g., Paul T. Davis, The Time for Merit Selection Will Come, 70 J. KAN. B. ASSOC.
5 (2001) (“For the past two years, the Kansas Bar Association has been leading the effort for the 
passage of a constitutional amendment providing for statewide, non-partisan merit selection of 
district court judges.”); Fred Logan, Kansas Should be Served by an Independent Judiciary, 70 J.
KAN. B. ASSOC. 3 (2001) (“The Kansas Commission on Judicial Qualifications took the rare step 
of endorsing merit selection of judges.”).  This terminology is used nationally by bar associations 
and other lawyers’ groups.  See, e.g., Alfred P. Carlton, Jr., Justice In Jeopardy: Report of the 
American Bar Association Commission on the 21st Century Judiciary, July 2003 (a portion of 
which is reproduced as Appendix C);  Norman Krivosha, In Celebration of the 50th Anniversary 
of Merit Selection, 74 JUDICATURE 128 (1990); American Judicature Society, Merit Selection: 
The Best Way to Choose the Best Judges, http://www.ajs.org/js/ms_descrip.pdf (last visited Oct. 
6, 2007).
23. See, e.g., Minutes of the House Federal and State Affairs Committee: Hearing on HCR 
– 5008 Before the H. Fed. and State Affairs Comm., (Kan. 2007) (statement of Richard C. Hite, 
Chair, Supreme Court Nominating Commission) (“Almost fifty years ago the citizens of this State 
mandated by constitutional amendment that election of Supreme Court Justices should be taken 
out of the political arena and based solely on merit.”); F. James Robinson Jr., Op-ed, Don’t Put 
Politics Back into Selection of Justices, WICHITA EAGLE, Feb. 21, 2007, at 7A (“Merit selection 
is a process that uses a nonpartisan commission of lawyers and nonlawyers to investigate, 
evaluate and occasionally recruit applicants for judgeships.  Applicants are chosen on the basis of 
their intellectual and technical abilities and not on the basis of their political or social 
connections.”); John Hanna, Father Wants Justices Confirmed; Senate Nixes Penalty Fix, HAYS 
DAILY NEWS, Feb. 22, 2005 (“Retired Supreme Court Justice Fred Six said the current system 
has ‘banished politics from the judicial playing field.’”); Editorial, Keep Judges Exempt From 
Elections, KAN. CITY STAR, May 21, 2006 (current system achieves “[t]he separation of judges 
from the political process.”). Members of the Commission say that politics plays no role in their 
deliberations. “’We never talk about politics in those meetings. It just doesn't come up,’ said 
Richard Hite, chairman of the nominating commission.” James Carlson, Method for Choosing 
High Court Justices Would Change With Resolution, TOPEKA CAPITAL-JOURNAL, Feb. 14, 2007, 
at 4.  See also David Klepper, Judge Applicants Face Panel, KAN. CITY STAR, May 23, 2005, at 
B1 (“The nominating commission - consisting of nine attorneys and lay persons - tries to take the 
politics out of the process. Questions of party loyalty or views on issues such as abortion are 
never asked, according to Hite. ‘We ignore everything except merit,’ Hite said. ‘The object is to 
find the best judge, period.’); Chris Grenz, Critics Question Democratic Majority on High Court, 
HUTCHINSON NEWS, Aug. 9, 2005 (“Dodge City attorney David J. Rebein, president-elect of the 
Kansas Bar Association and a member of the nominating commission, said the current selection 
system was put in place specifically to filter out politics.  “At the nominating commission level, it 
doesn't even come up,” Rebein said. “It is by design strictly merit based.”).
24. See infra Appendix A (listing party of non-lawyer commissioners appointed by 
Democratic governors in 1979-86, 1991-94 and 2003-07 and by Republican governors in 1987-90 
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Table 2
Governor’s Appointments to
Kansas Supreme Court Nominating Commission, 1987 – 2007






In addition to consistently partisan appointments to the Commission, there 
is a strikingly partisan record of appointments to the Supreme Court itself.  
During the twenty-year period from 1987 to 2007, eleven new justices were 
appointed to the court.25  Nine of the eleven justices belonged to the same 
political party as the governor who appointed them.26  In one of the other two 
cases the governor could not appoint a justice from his party because none of 
the three individuals submitted to the governor belonged to that party.27  In 
other words, in nine of the ten cases in which the governor could pick a 
member of the governor’s party, the governor did so.  So the governor’s role—
in this allegedly “non-partisan” process—has been quite partisan, although not 
invariably so.28  And in one of the last eleven cases, the Commission forced the 
governor to select an individual who did not belong to the governor’s party.29  
This data on the appointment of justices is depicted in Table 3, which follows.
and 1995-2002.) By contrast, research for this paper was not able to identify the party affiliation 
of all the lawyer members of the Commission.  Of those lawyer members for whom party 
affiliation was available, there were seven Democrats, thirteen Republicans and zero 
Independents or members of third parties.  See id.  This translates into 35% Democrats, 65% 
Republicans and 0% Independents or members of third parties.  The Kansas electorate as a whole 
consists of 26.8% Democrats, 46.2% Republicans and 27% Independents or members of third 
parties.  See MICHAEL BARONE, ALMANAC OF AMERICAN POLITICS 677 (2006).
25. See infra Appendix A.
26. Id.
27. Id. (Justice Luckert).
28. This is not a fluke of Kansas.  According to scholars assessing judicial selection around 
the country, “Few deny that the Governor, although limited in his or her choice, applies political 
criteria in judging the three nominees submitted by the nominating commission.  Assuming that 
the three are nearly equal in terms of qualifications, the one most politically attractive receives the 
Governor’s nod.” CHARLES H. SHELDON & LINDA S. MAULE, CHOOSING JUSTICE: THE 
RECRUITMENT OF STATE AND FEDERAL JUDGES 131 (1997).  
29. See infra Appendix A (Justice Luckert).
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Table 3






justice not from 
governor’s party





None of nominees in 
governor’s party
0 1
III. THE DEBATE OVER REFORM
There is a nationwide debate over whether “non-partisan,” “merit” 
selection of judges should be reformed to achieve two goals: first, to reduce the 
amount of control exercised by the bar, and, second, to subject the political 
side of the judicial selection process to a more public system of checks and 
balances.30  This paper provides a brief history of selection to the Kansas 
Supreme Court before discussing possible reforms.
A. The 1958 Kansas Plan
Until 1958, Kansans elected their supreme court justices.  The 
establishment of the Kansas Supreme Court Nominating Commission in 1958 
was a reaction to events that had occurred after the most recently preceding 
general election.
30. See, e.g., Editorial, Show Me the Judges, WALL ST. J., Aug. 30, 2007, at A10; Blunt 
Trauma, supra note 15.  The same process currently used to select justices for the Kansas 
Supreme Court is also currently used to select all judges on the Kansas Court of Appeals.  See
KAN. STAT. ANN. §20-3004 (2006).  In most of the state’s judicial districts, a similar process is 
used to select district judges.  See generally Stacie L. Sanders, Note, Kissing Babies, Shaking 
Hands, and Campaign Contributions: Is This the Proper Role for the Kansas Judiciary?, 34 
WASHBURN L. J. 573 (1995).  Accordingly, the case for reforming this process applies to all these 
courts but it applies most strongly to the Kansas Supreme Court simply because it is the state’s 
highest court and lower courts follow its precedents.
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A resolution for the submission of a constitutional amendment 
which would adopt the commission plan [for the selection of 
supreme court justices] was introduced in 1953, but defeated in 
the house judiciary committee.  Again proposed in 1955, the 
resolution was defeated in the senate judiciary committee.  
However, subsequent events were to lead to the adoption of the 
commission plan for the selection of supreme court justices: 
The intensive lobbying efforts of the Kansas Bar Association; 
and public outcry over the infamous “triple play” of 1956.
The “triple play” involved Chief Justice of Kansas Supreme 
Court Bill Smith, Governor Fred Hall, and Lieutenant Governor 
John McCuish.  In 1956, Governor Hall was defeated in the 
Republican Primary by Warren Shaw, who then lost the general 
election to Democrat George Docking.  In December of that 
year, Chief Justice Smith, who was seriously ill, forwarded his 
resignation to Governor Hall.  Hall then immediately resigned 
his post of Governor in favor of Lieutenant Governor McCuish, 
who prematurely returned from a Newton Hospital to make his 
first and only official act of his 11 day tenure as Governor: The 
appointment of Hall to the supreme court.  Such a result would 
have been avoided under the commission plan, as the 
nominating commission would have determined which 
candidates to send to the governor for appointment, rather than 
allowing the governor to appoint replacement justices in 
between elections.
The legislature submitted a proposal to amend the constitution 
to adopt the commission plan for the selection of supreme court 
justices only, and this amendment was passed by a wide margin 
in the 1958 general election.31
In short, the current Commission system was rejected in 1953 and 1955 but—
after the “triple play” of 1956—was passed in the next general election.  The 
“intensive lobbying efforts of the Kansas Bar Association” combined with the 
“triple play” to give Kansas its current supreme court selection process.
The lesson of the “triple play” is that governors should not have absolute 
power over the selection of supreme court justices.  “Power tends to corrupt, 
and absolute power corrupts absolutely.”32  The Framers of the United States 
Constitution were acutely aware of this risk and their masterful achievement 
was designing a system of government in which power was divided and 
constrained by a system of checks and balances.33  In appointing justices to the 
31. Jeffrey D. Jackson, The Selection of Judges in Kansas: A Comparison of Systems, 69 J.
KAN. B. ASSOC. 32, 34 (2000) (citations omitted).
32. Letter from Lord Acton to Bishop Mandell Creighton (1887), see http:// 
www.phrases.org.uk/meanings/288200.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2007).
33. See generally THE FEDERALIST NOS. 47, 48, 49, 50, 51 (James Madison) (Clinton 
Rossiter ed., 1999) (discussing and explaining the need for separation of powers and checks and 
balances).
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United States Supreme Court, the president’s power is checked by the power of 
the United States Senate.  The Constitution requires a majority vote of the 
Senate in order to confirm a justice to the United States Supreme Court.34  By 
contrast, at the time of the “triple play” the Kansas Constitution lacked this 
check on the Governor’s power to appoint a justice to the Kansas Supreme 
Court.
Anger over the “triple play” prompted the addition of a check on the 
governor’s power to select justices.  This new check on the governor’s power 
was given, not to the Kansas Senate, but to the bar (lawyers licensed to 
practice in the state).  Rather than following the United States Constitution to 
make the Legislature the check on the Executive’s power, the 1958 change 
made the bar the check on the Executive’s power.35
B. Is The Bar an Interest Group or “Faction”?
Lawyers, because of their professional expertise and interest in the 
judiciary, are well-suited to recognizing which candidates for a judgeship are 
especially knowledgeable and skilled lawyers.  But lawyers assessing 
applicants for a judgeship are also human beings.  Can we be confident that all 
the lawyers on a nominating commission will be willing and able to put aside 
completely all their personal views in favor of some non-political conception 
of “merit”? Scholars who have studied judicial nominating commissions 
around the United States conclude that the commissions are very political, but 
that their politics—rather than being the politics of the citizenry as a whole—
are “a somewhat subterranean politics of bar and bench involving little popular 
control.”36
34. U.S. CONST. art II, § 2.
35. Technically, of course, it is the Commission rather than the bar that is the check on the 
governor.  But the governor appoints four of the nine commissioners so, except insofar as they are 
holdovers appointed by a previous governor of a different party, those four are unlikely to serve 
as much of a check on the governor.  The check on the governor, if it comes from the 
Commission at all, is more likely to come from the five commissioners elected by the bar.  See 
supra Part II, Table 2 (showing, from 1987 to 2007, all fourteen of the commissioners appointed 
by Democratic governors were Democrats and all eight of the commissioners appointed by 
Republican governors were Republicans).
36. HARRY P. STUMPF & KEVIN C. PAUL, AMERICAN JUDICIAL POLITICS 142 (2d ed. 
1998).  Judicial selection through a nominating commission was first adopted in Missouri and is 
often called “the Missouri Plan.”  The classic study of the first twenty-five years of this process in 
Missouri is a book by Richard A. Watson & Rondal G. Downing, THE POLITICS OF THE BENCH 
AND THE BAR (1969).  A textbook summarizes their findings as follows:
[F]ar from taking judicial selection out of politics, the Missouri Plan actually 
tended to replace Politics, wherein the judge faces popular election (or selection 
by a popularly elected official), with a somewhat subterranean politics of bar and 
bench involving little popular control.  There is, then, a sense in which merit
selection does operate to enhance the weight of professional influence in the 
selection process (one of its stated goals) in that lawyers and judges are given a 
direct, indeed official, role in the nominating process.  On close examination, 
however, one finds raw political considerations masquerading as professionalism 
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The conclusion is inescapable: “merit” selection has little or no 
merit, if by merit we mean that nonpolitical (that is, professional) 
considerations dominate the selection process.
. . .
Not only is there little evidence of the superiority of judges 
selected by the “merit” system (although there is some evidence to 
the contrary), but also there is little to show that judicial selection 
mechanisms make any difference at all. . . .
. . .
Where are we then?  If the lay, the professional, and even the 
political inputs built into the Missouri Plan[37], do not work as 
advertised, and if the plan in general cannot be shown to produce 
superior judges, what is left of the argument?  The answer is, not 
much.  In a thorough examination of the Missouri Plan undertaken 
by Henry Glick, other avenues of analysis were pursued, but the 
results in no instance reveal redeeming support for the claims 
made for merit selection.  Why, then does bar, bench, and general 
public support for the plan continue, and why is the plan being 
adopted in more and more states?  The specific reasons are many, 
but they ultimately boil down to an aggrandizement of national
and state bar associations.
The legal profession desires a larger voice in judicial selection for 
the same reason that other interest groups do—to advance their 
cause through judicial policymaking.  “Merit” selection gives 
them that added leverage.  All the better if they can sell their old 
line of increased political influence over the courts by using the 
attractive, but phony, label of “neutral professionalism.”38
via attorney representation of the socioeconomic interests of their clients.
STUMPF & PAUL, supra, at 142.
37. Judicial selection through a nominating commission was first adopted in Missouri and is 
often called “the Missouri Plan.”
38. STUMPF & PAUL, supra note 36, at 142-47.  See also Malia Reddick, Merit Selection: A 
Review of the Social Scientific Literature, 106 DICK. L. REV. 729, 744 (2002) (citation omitted) 
(“This review of social scientific research on merit selection systems does not lend much 
credence to proponents’ claims that merit selection insulates judicial selection from political 
forces, makes judges accountable to the public, and identifies judges who are substantially 
different from judges chosen through other systems.  Evidence shows that many nominating 
commissioners have held political and public offices and political considerations figure into at 
least some of their deliberations.  Bar associations are able to influence the process through 
identifying commission members and evaluating judges . . . .  Finally, there are no significant, 
systematic differences between merit-selected judges and other judges.”); HARRY P. STUMPF &
JOHN H. CULVER, THE POLITICS OF STATE COURTS 41 (1991) (“The primary appeal of the merit 
plan for judicial selection rests with the implication that it is a nonpartisan mechanism.  
Additionally, proponents claim that judges of a higher ‘quality’ are more likely to reach the bench 
via this system than any other.  However, experience with the merit plan indicates that it is a very 
political one, with state and local bar politics substituting for public politics.”).
Practicing lawyers and judges confirm the scholars’ conclusion.  See Robert L. Brown, From 
Whence Cometh our State Appellate Judges: Popular Election Versus the Missouri Plan, 20 U.
ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 313, 321 (1998) (“Even in states which use the Missouri Plan, 
nominating commissions are subject to considerable lobbying by single-issue groups and political 
parties in the development of a slate of judicial candidates.  So is the governor once the slate is 
prepared and presented.  It is politics, but politics of a different stripe.”); Harry O. Lawson, 
Methods of Judicial Selection, 75 MICH. B.J. 20, 24 (1996) (“Merit selection does not take 
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Critics of “merit” selection point out that lawyers comprise an interest 
group just like other interest groups.  Bar associations aggressively lobby for 
the interests of their lawyer-members.  While they may articulate reasons why 
the policies that favor lawyers also serve the public interest, bar associations 
have repeatedly advocated policies that favor lawyers and that have been 
viewed by others as harming the public as a whole.39  The selection of supreme 
court justices through a process controlled by the bar is just one example of 
this form of advocacy.40  Relatedly, members of the Kansas Supreme Court 
Nominating Commission could be lobbied and influenced by some of that 
lobbying.41
politics out of the judicial selection process.  It merely changes the nature of the political process 
involved.  It substitutes bar and elitist politics for those of the electorate as a whole.”).
39. See, e.g., DEBORAH L. RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE 69 (2004) (“Bar efforts to restrain 
lawyers’ competitive practices have inflated the costs and reduced the accessibility of legal 
assistance.  Although the courts have increasingly curtailed these efforts through constitutional 
rulings, the bar’s regulatory structure has remained overly responsive to professional interests at 
the expense of the pubic.”); id. at 87 (“Giving qualified nonlawyers a greater role in providing 
routine legal assistance is likely to have a . . . positive effect, but the organized bar is pushing 
hard in the opposite direction.”); Norman W. Spaulding, The Luxury of the Law: The Codification 
Movement and the Right to Counsel, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 983, 994 (2004) (with respect to 
access to justice for people of modest means, “Bar associations have behaved more like rent-
seeking interest groups than the self-policing, public-minded regulatory bodies they purport to be; 
state legislatures and state supreme courts have too long caved to patently self-serving claims by 
bar associations for insulation from direct public regulation . . . .”); George B. Shepherd, No 
African-American Lawyers Allowed: The Inefficient Racism of the ABA's Accreditation of Law 
Schools, 53 J. LEGAL EDUC. 103, 105 (2003) (with respect to accreditation of law schools, 
American Bar Association lobbies for a set of rules that “forces one style of law training, at Rolls-
Royce prices” which reduces the supply of lawyers); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, 
An Economic Analysis of Conflict of Interest Regulation, 82 Iowa L. Rev. 965, 967 (1997) (“some 
[legal] ethics rules can indeed be understood as serving the interest of the organized bar at the 
expense of social wealth.”); Roger C. Cramton, Delivery of Legal Services to Ordinary 
Americans, 44 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 531, 567 (1994) (“the organized bar, beginning in the 1930s, 
negotiated treaties with organized groups of competitors that had the effect of dividing the market 
for services in areas reserved for lawyers, on the one hand, and accountants, architects, claims 
adjusters, collection agencies, liability insurance companies, lawbook publishers, professional 
engineers, realtors, title companies, trust companies, and social workers, on the other.  The 
growth of the consumer movement and the evolution of federal antitrust law brought an end to 
this market division strategy.”) id. at 575 (discussing organized bar’s opposition to group legal 
service arrangements).
40. The American Bar Association has lobbied for judges selected by nominating 
commissions since 1937.  STUMPF & PAUL, supra note 36 at 138.  See also infra Appendix C,
JUSTICE IN JEOPARDY, REPORT OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASS’N COMMISSION ON THE 21ST
CENTURY JUDICIARY (2003).
41. See, e.g., Joseph A. Colquitt, Rethinking Judicial Nominating Commissions: 
Independence, Accountability, and Public Support, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 73, 100 (2007).
The commission needs to be open to, and receptive of, external input. Rules of 
conduct should help reduce political control, not eliminate public input. 
Nevertheless, a code of ethics must address the external pressures that may exert 
themselves upon the commissioners. Political pressure may come from 
individuals, political parties, and industry and special interest groups that exist 
within the constituency. Commissioners should receive information from 
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The Framers of the United States Constitution recognized a danger from 
interest groups, or “factions” as they were then called42  The Federalist Papers 
propose several cures for the “mischiefs of faction.”43  The most famous is the 
system of “checks and balances,” which divides power and sets factions 
against one another, ensuring that none can gain control for itself.44  The 
question is whether such a system is in place in Kansas: are the critics correct 
that the process for judicial selection gives too much control to a single 
faction?  The executive branch’s power to appoint members of the judicial 
branch is checked, not by the legislative branch, but by a nine-person
commission in which a majority are selected by the bar.
C. Reduce Bar Control of the Nominating Commission?
Several possible reforms would reduce the control a single faction, the 
bar, has over the process of selecting justices to the Kansas Supreme Court.  
One such reform would simply reduce the portion of the Commission selected 
by the bar.  The majority of the twenty-four states with supreme court 
nominating commissions allow the bar to select less than one-third of the 
commission’s members.45  Kansas could move toward the mainstream of states 
by, for instance, allowing the Speaker of the House and President of the Senate 
constituents, whether those constituents speak individually or collectively through 
organizations. Such information, however, should be properly channeled to the 
commission as an entity and not to individual commissioners by way of 
surreptitious meetings or ex parte communications.
Id. at 100-01.  In Kansas, House Speaker Melvin Neufeld said the bar played too large a role and 
the system needs to be reformed so a Governor's nominee to the high court faces Senate 
confirmation.  See Tim Carpenter, Appeals Court Judge Named to High Court, TOPEKA CAPITAL-
JOURNAL, Jan. 6, 2007, at A1.  Neufeld said, "That setup that we now have has evolved to a 
good-old-boy club." Id.   A “good-old-boy club,” with its associations of exclusivity and 
privilege, is an apt description of how the Commission looks to many of those who are not 
members of the bar.  This is a shame because of the good faith and hard work exhibited by those 
the bar elects to the Commission.  But when a single interest group controls an important 
governmental process -- and exercises that control in a largely secret manner -- outsiders can be 
excused for being suspicious and resentful.  Courts have held such interest-group control 
unconstitutional when the interest group in question were not lawyers.  See Senator Susan Wagle, 
Confirm Justices, WICHITA EAGLE, Mar. 6, 2005, at 15A (“The nominating committee is 
controlled by a majority of attorneys, the very individuals who appear before the courts seeking 
favor. In a similar situation in 1993, the federal courts declared the process by which Kansas 
selected its secretary of agriculture unconstitutional. The secretary used to be selected by the farm 
groups that the secretary regulated. The Legislature changed the position to one selected by the 
governor and subject to the Senate confirmation process.”).
42. See THE FEDERALIST No. 9 (Alexander Hamilton), No.10 (James Madison) (Clinton 
Rossiter ed., 1999).
43. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, (James Madison), supra, note 42.
44. See THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison), supra note 42.
45. The thirteen states allowing the bar to select less than one-third are Arizona, Colorado, 
Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Maryland, Massachusetts, New York, Rhode Island, South 
Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, and Vermont, see supra notes 8 & 10, while the eleven states allowing 
the bar to select more than one-third are: Alaska, California, Florida, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, 
Missouri, Nebraska, Oklahoma, South Dakota, and Wyoming. See supra notes 4-5 and 8.
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to select two commissioners each, while the bar and Governor select three and 
two commissioners, respectively.  In addition to moving Kansas toward the 
mainstream of states with respect to bar control, this reform would also bring 
Kansas in line with the ten states in which the legislature selects some of the 
commissioners or has confirmation power over those the governor selects.46  
According to Professor (and former judge) Joseph Colquitt, allowing the 
legislature to select some of the commissioners “diverts the power from the 
governor, who usually will be charged with appointing judges from the slate 
nominated by the commission.  Placing the power to appoint or elect 
commissioners in hands other than the appointing authority for judges better 
addresses both democratic ideals and commission-independence concerns.”47
A reform to allow the Kansas Legislature to appoint members of the 
Kansas Supreme Court Nominating Commission would reduce the bar’s 
control over the Kansas Supreme Court selection process.  But, it would not 
open up the process by exposing the commissioners’ votes to the public.  It is 
possible to require that the votes of the Commission be made public—so 
everyone can learn which commissioners voted for or against which 
applicants—but most judicial nominating commissions around the country 
vote in secret.48  Other ways to expose the political side of the judicial 
selection process include judicial elections and senate confirmation of judicial 
nominees.  These are discussed next.
D. Electing Supreme Court Justices
Kansans elected supreme court justices prior to 1958 and a recent 
proposal in the Legislature sought to revive this process.49  While electing 
supreme court justices reduces bar control, it also has many drawbacks.  These 
include:
the appearance of impropriety caused by judges taking money 
from those who appear before them, the threat to judicial 
independence resulting from a judge’s dependence on campaign 
contributions and party support, the reduced perception of 
impartiality caused by statements of judicial candidates on 
political or social issues, the elimination of qualified lawyers 
46. These states are: Alaska, Arizona, Connecticut, Hawaii, Iowa, New York, Rhode Island, 
South Carolina, Tennessee and Vermont. See supra notes 5, 8, and 10.
47. Colquitt, supra note 41, at 94-95.
48. “Most commissions vote by secret ballot in closed, executive session. . . . In a few 
jurisdictions, a non-binding vote is done in closed, executive session and then conducted again in 
public.”  AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, HANDBOOK FOR JUDICIAL NOMINATING 
COMMISSIONERS, 25 (2d ed. 2004) http://www.ajs.org/selection/docs/JNC_Handbk-Ch2.pdf
(citations omitted) (citing, for the latter proposition, Section 8 of the New Mexico Rules 
Governing Judicial Nominating Commissions).
49. Sarah Kessinger, Proposal calls for electing judges to high court, HUTCHINSON NEWS, 
Feb. 12, 2005.  That proposal was House Concurrent Resolution No. 5012 (2005), introduced by 
Representative Lynne Oharah, and hearings were held before the House Committee on Federal 
and State Affairs on March 17, 2005.  No action was taken.
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who would otherwise be willing to serve as jurists, and the loss 
of public confidence caused by the vile rhetoric of judicial 
campaigns.50
The appearance of impropriety and threat to judicial independence are 
exacerbated by the fact that judicial campaign contributions tend to come from 
those who seek favorable decisions from the court.  As Professor Paul 
Carrington explains:
Judicial candidates receive money from lawyers and litigants 
appearing in their courts; rarely are there contributions from any 
other source.  Even when the amounts are relatively small, the 
contributions look a little like bribes or shake-downs related to 
the outcomes of past or future lawsuits.  A fundamental 
difference exists between judicial and legislative offices in this 
respect because judges decide the rights and duties of 
individuals even when they are making policy; hence any 
connection between a judge and a person appearing in his or her 
court is a potential source of mistrust. . . .  There have been 
celebrated occasions . . . when very large contributions were 
made by lawyers or parties who thereafter secured large 
favorable judgments or remunerative appointments such as 
receiverships.51
The Chief Justice of the Texas Supreme Court similarly asked, “when a 
winning litigant has contributed thousands of dollars to the judge’s campaign, 
how do you ever persuade the losing party that only the facts of the case were 
considered?”52
50. Mark A. Behrens & Cary Silverman, The Case for Adopting Appointive Judicial 
Selection Systems for State Court Judges, 11 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 273, 276 (2002).
51. Paul Carrington, Judicial Independence and Democratic Accountability in Highest State 
Courts, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 79, 91-92 (1998) (citations omitted).
52. Presser et al., supra note 12, at 378 (quoting Thomas R. Phillips).  A distinction should 
be drawn
when the campaign contributor is not a single lawyer or litigant, but rather a large 
group of people who band together to advance their political philosophy.  A 
single contributor may seek only victories in cases in which the contributor 
appears as a party or lawyer.  In contrast, an interest group may have a broad 
policy agenda, such as protecting the environment or deregulating the economy.  
Such an interest group may contribute to the campaigns of judges who share its 
political philosophy, just as it may contribute to the campaigns of like-minded 
candidates for other public offices.  If such an interest group succeeds, it affects 
the results in many cases in which the winning parties and lawyers are not 
members of the interest group.  In short, the interest group succeeds, not by 
buying justice in individual cases, but by buying policy that influences a range of 
cases.  
Stephen J. Ware, Money, Politics and Judicial Decisions: A Case Study of Arbitration Law in 
Alabama, 15 J.L. & POL. 645, 653-654 (1999), reprinted in, 30 CAP. U. L. REV. 583 (2002).  The 
possibility of contributors “buying justice” in individual cases is the primary concern about 
judicial elections.  The possibility of contributors “buying policy” over a range of cases is a 
secondary concern and one that raises more nuanced issues.  No plausible system of judicial 
selection can be completely insulated from the efforts of interest groups to influence policy.  Even 
the federal system of judicial appointment with life tenure is subject to these efforts as interest 
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E. Senate Confirmation of Supreme Court Justices
Proposals to elect Kansas Supreme Court justices have received less 
support in recent years than proposals to require Senate confirmation of them.  
In 2005, Senators Derek Schmidt and Susan Wagle proposed a constitutional 
amendment that would have kept the Supreme Court Nominating Commission 
but, after the governor picked one of the three names submitted by the 
Commission, that person would be appointed to the Supreme Court only with 
consent of the State Senate.53  This proposal is similar to the law in the ten 
states that have both a supreme court nominating commission and confirmation 
by the legislature or other publicly-elected officials.54
Under this proposal, if the Senate did not confirm the governor’s nominee 
then the governor would pick one of the other two names submitted by the 
Commission.  If the Senate did not confirm any of the three individuals then 
the Commission would submit three additional names to the governor and the 
process would continue until a nominee received the consent of the Senate.  In 
2005, this proposal passed the Senate Judiciary Committee on a 6-4 vote,55 but 
did not go to a vote in the Senate.56  In 2006, it did go to a vote in the Senate.  
A 22-17 majority of senators voted for it, but that was still five votes short of 
the two-thirds necessary for a constitutional amendment.57
In both 2006 and 2007, Representative Lance Kinzer proposed abolition 
of the Supreme Court Nominating Commission.  Instead, justices would be 
nominated by the governor and appointed to the Supreme Court after 
groups contribute to the presidential and senatorial campaigns of candidates likely to appoint and 
confirm the judges expected to advance the interest group’s preferred policy positions.  The 
difference between the federal system and a system of electing judges is that in the federal system 
interest-group influence over judge-made policy is indirect because it operates through the 
president and senators and these intermediaries campaign on a range of issues besides judicial 
selection.  See id.  By contrast, judicial selection is the only issue in judicial campaigns so 
interest-group influence over judge-made policy is more direct in a system of elected judges. See
infra text accompanying notes 77-78 (contrasting political theory behind judicial elections with 
that behind federal system of judicial selection).
53. See S. Con. Res. 1606 (Kan. 2005).  See also David Klepper, Nomination Process 
Scrutinized, KAN. CITY STAR, Feb. 10, 2005, at B3.
54. See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
55. Steve Painter, Senators Seek Say in Judge Selection: A Proposed Constitutional 
Amendment Would Change the Way Kansas Picks Its Supreme Court Justices, WICHITA EAGLE, 
Mar. 20, 2005, at 1B.
56. Steve Painter, Topeka Judge To Join High Court: The Governor’s Choice Wins Praise 
From Legislators, WICHITA EAGLE, July 23, 2005, at 1A.
57. See KAN. CONST. art. XIV, §§ 1-2.  An amendment to the constitution can originate in 
either house.  It must then be approved by two-thirds of the members of each house, and then at 
the next or through a special election the majority of voters must approve.  A revision can also 
occur through constitutional convention to revise all or part of the document.  Each house must 
approve this by a two-thirds vote.  At the following election the majority of voters must approve 
the convention.  At the next (or a special) election, delegates are elected from each district.  After 
meeting and reaching consensus, the proposals of the convention are submitted to the voters for 
majority approval.  See id.
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confirmation by the Senate.58  This proposal is similar to the process used in 
three states and at the federal level.59  This proposal was the subject of 
committee hearings,60 but did not receive a vote of the full House.61
The push for Senate confirmation came shortly after two controversial 
Kansas Supreme Court decisions, one on school finance and the other on the 
death penalty.62  This timing led many people to view the push for Senate 
confirmation as, to use the words of Senator John Vratil, “an overreaction to 
our discontent with two decisions.”63  According to this view, the process for 
selecting justices should not be amended just because many people disagree 
with a couple of the court’s decisions.  As Senator Vratil said, “We need to 
take a much longer viewpoint and not just react in knee-jerk fashion to a 
couple of decisions that are unpopular.”64
So the question is, when taking the long view, did the Framers of the 
United States Constitution get it right?  They created three co-equal branches 
of government (executive, legislative and judicial) and a system of checks and 
balances that has stood the test of time longer than any other written 
constitution in human history.65  A cardinal virtue of the United States 
Constitution is that, at crucial points, each branch is checked by both of the 
other two branches.  For example, a member of the judicial branch is 
nominated by the executive and confirmed by the legislature.66  These checks 
come from elected officials, responsible to the public as a whole, not a single 
interest group or “faction.”  Also, these checks take the form of public votes.  
As a result, citizens can hold their president and senators accountable for these 
important decisions on election day.67  By contrast, the Kansas Supreme Court 
58. H.R. Con. Res. 5033 (Kan. 2006); H.R. Con. Res. 5008 (Kan. 2007).
59. These states are Maine, New Hampshire and New Jersey.  See supra notes 10-12.
60. James Carlson, Method for Choosing High Court Justices Would Change with 
Resolution, TOPEKA CAPITAL-JOURNAL, Feb. 14, 2007, at 4.  The Feb. 8, 2006 hearing on H.R. 
Con. Res. 5033 was before the House Judiciary Committee.  See infra note 68.  The Feb. 13, 2007 
hearing on H.R. Con. Res. 5008 was before the House Federal and State Affairs Committee.  See 
infra note 70.
61. A motion to favorably report it out of the House Judiciary Committee failed by a vote of 
ten to eight on March 23, 2006.
62. See generally John Hanna, ‘Triple Play’ Should Guide Legislators, HAYS DAILY 
NEWS, Feb. 14, 2005 (“The proposal to modify justices’ selection is a response to recent court 
decisions striking down the state’s death penalty law and ordering legislators to improve 
education funding.  Some Republicans complain the court now has an activist streak and believe 
Senate confirmation of members would make it more accountable.”).
63. Carl Manning, Proposed Amendment to Require Senate Confirmation of Justices Shot 
Down, HAYS DAILY NEWS, Mar. 10, 2006 (quoting Senator John Vratil).
64. Hanna, supra note 62.
65. See, e.g., David A.J. Richards, Constitutional Legitimacy and Constitutional Privacy, 61 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 800, 811 (1986).
66. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
67. Id.  In addition, the United States Constitution promotes accountability by placing the 
appointment responsibility solely on the president, the individual in whom executive power is 
vested.  By contrast, Kansas currently spreads that responsibility among the governor and the 
nine-member Commission.  As John McGinnis explains:
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Nominating Commission’s votes are secret.  Consequently, even the few 
privileged citizens entitled to vote for commissioners cannot hold them 
individually accountable for these important decisions.68
IV. OPPOSITION TO SENATE CONFIRMATION
Officials of the Kansas Bar Association defend Kansas’ current system of 
Supreme Court selection and resist reform.69  In addition to arguing (as 
discussed above) that the current system emphasizes merit rather than 
politics,70 they have argued that Senate confirmation would be a “circus.”71  
The principal concern of the Framers regarding the Appointment Clause, as in 
many of the other separation of powers provisions of the Constitution, was to 
ensure accountability while avoiding tyranny.  Hence, following the example of 
the Massachusetts Constitution drafted by John Adams, the Framers gave the 
power of nomination to the President so that the initiative of choice would be a 
single individual’s responsibility but provided the check of advice and consent [of 
the Senate] to forestall the possibility of abuse of this power.
John McGinnis, Appointments Clause, in THE HERITAGE GUIDE TO THE CONSTITUTION (David 
F. Forte, ed. 2005) (emphasis added).
68. See supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text.
69. See, e.g., Hearing on S. Con. Res. 1606 Before the S. Judiciary Comm. (Kan. 2005) 
(statements by Jack Focht, Past President of the Kan. Bar Ass’n, on Feb. 21, 2005); Hearing on 
H. Con. Res. 5033 Before the H. Judiciary Comm. (Kan. 2006) (statements by Richard F. Hayse, 
Past President of the Kan. Bar Ass’n, on Feb. 8, 2006); Hearing on H. Con. Res. 5008 Before the 
H. Comm. on Federal and State Affairs (Kan. 2007) (statements by Richard Hayse on Feb. 13, 
2007).  See also Tim Carpenter, Senators Want to Have Say Under Plan, Justices Would Require 
Senate Confirmation, TOPEKA CAPITAL-JOURNAL, Feb. 10, 2005 at 1C (“Gov. Kathleen Sebelius 
said there was no reason to alter the appointment process. ‘I think that the system that we've had 
in place for a number of years has worked extremely well,’ she said. ‘I think the system 
works.’”); Klepper, supra note 53 (responding to a proposal for Senate confirmation, “Supreme 
Court spokesman Ron Keefover said the court is happy with the current method of selection.”).
70. See supra notes 22-29 and accompanying text.
71. See, e.g., Hearing on H. Con. Res. 5008 Before the H. Comm. on Federal and State 
Affairs (Kan. 2007) (statements by Richard F. Hayse, Past President of the Kan. Bar. Ass’n, on 
Feb. 13, 2007).  See also Editorial, Senate right to retain status quo, MANHATTAN MERCURY, 
Mar. 12, 2006 at C8 (quoting Senator John Vratil, “‘Is the circus that masquerades as the 
confirmation process in the United States Senate a process we want to emulate?’”); John D. 
Montgomery, Editorial, No problem, HAYS DAILY NEWS, Feb. 11, 2005 (“So, would a state 
Supreme Court selection process mirroring the federal process be better in Kansas? Maybe not. 
Consider how political judicial confirmation is in Washington. Extremely political. Do we want 
that in Kansas?”); Infra Appendix C, (“The protracted and combative confirmation process in the 
federal system, coupled with the highly politicized relationship between governors and legislators 
in many states, has led the Commission not to recommend such an approach.”).  Also, some 
opponents of senate confirmation express concern that the Kansas Legislature, unlike the United 
States Congress, is a part-time legislature.  See, e.g., Hearing on H. Con. Res. 5008 Before the H. 
Comm. on Federal and State Affairs (Kan. 2007) (statements by Retired Justice Fred N. Six on 
Feb. 13, 2007).  Several states with senate confirmation, however, have part time legislatures. 
See National Conference of State Legislatures, http://www.ncsl.org/programs/press/2004/ 
backgrounder_fullandpart.htm (last visited Oct. 4, 2007) (listing Maine, Rhode Island, Utah and 
Vermont as part-time).  If a vacancy on the Kansas Supreme Court occurred when the Kansas 
Legislature was not in session then a special session could be called or the seat could simply 
remain vacant until the Legislature’s regular session.
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One commentator went further and wrote:
It’s not hard to imagine a scenario, similar to what takes place 
in the U.S. Senate, where state senators, with liberal and 
conservative litmus tests, end up politicizing the confirmation 
hearings and the final vote on a nominee.
However, the consequences of this battle in Kansas may be 
unlike the national level.  A Kansas justice, wounded by his or 
her confirmation battle, will be ripe for an acrimonious 
retention vote.  Ideologically motivated groups, who lost their 
battles in the state Senate, might go gunning for that justice in 
the ballot box.  At the national level, U.S. Supreme Court 
justices don’t face a retention vote.  Thus, time has a chance to 
heal the wounds inflicted by their confirmation hearings.72
Is this war-like vision of battling senators and wounded justices likely to 
occur if Kansas adopts senate confirmation?  To assess that, one can look to 
the experience of the twelve states that have senate confirmation or 
confirmation by a similar popularly-elected body.73  Research for this paper 
examined the last two votes for initial supreme court confirmation in each of 
these twelve states.74  In all twenty-four of these cases, the governor’s nominee 
was confirmed.  In nearly eighty percent of these cases, the vote in favor of 
confirmation was unanimous.75  In only two of these twenty four cases was 
there more than a single dissenting vote.76  These facts provide little support 
for the view that senate confirmation of state supreme court justices tends to 
produce a circus, let alone a war.
The opposite concern about senate confirmation is that it is merely a 
rubber stamp so governors routinely appoint whoever they want.  There are 
indications, however, that—rather than acting as a rubber stamp—senate 
confirmation may be a deterrent.  Governors know that senate confirmation of 
controversial nominees may be difficult,77 so governors consider, in advance, 
72. Joseph A. Aistrup, Supreme Court Confirmation Amendment, HAYS DAILY NEWS, 
Feb. 28, 2005.
73. Ten of these twelve states have supreme court nominating commissions.  See supra
notes 10-12 and accompanying text.  For discussion on California’s unique system, see supra
note 12.
74. See infra Appendix B.  The votes presented in Appendix B are for the state’s highest 
court regardless of whether or not it is named the supreme court.  The votes examined are the last 
two votes for initial supreme court confirmation, rather than retention or elevation of an associate 
justice to chief justice.  In Connecticut, the 2006 nomination of an associate justice for chief 
justice was not put to a vote because the nominee withdrew his name.  See Lynne Tuohy, Court 
Saga Left Bruises, Balm, HARTFORD COURANT, Mar. 17, 2007, at A1.
75. Seventeen of the twenty-four votes were unanimous and two were effectively 
unanimous because they were voice votes with no tally recorded.
76. See infra Appendix B.
77. The Founders recognized that Senate confirmation would deter the executive from 
controversial nominees.  As Alexander Hamilton wrote, “The necessity of [Senate] concurrence 
would have a powerful though in general, a silent operation.  It would be an excellent check upon 
a spirit of favoritism in the President, and would tend greatly to preventing the appointment of 
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the wishes of the senate in deciding who to nominate.78  Of course, whether 
this generalization is accurate or not, ultimate responsibility for the tenor of the 
senate confirmation process rests on the senators themselves.  Similarly, 
ultimate responsibility for the outcome of the senate confirmation process—
whether a nominee is confirmed or not—also rests with the senators who are 
accountable to the citizens on election day.
In short, senate confirmation makes judicial selection accountable to the 
people.  It does so without judicial elections, which embody the passion for 
direct democracy prevalent in the Jacksonian era.79  Rather, senate 
confirmation exemplifies the republicanism of our Nation’s Founders.  The 
Framers of the United States Constitution devised a system of indirect 
democracy in which the structure of government mediates and cools the 
momentary passions of popular majorities.80  Senate confirmation strives to 
make judicial selection accountable to the people while protecting the judiciary 
against the possibility that the people may act rashly.
V. JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
In defending Kansas’ current system for selecting justices, some members 
of the bar  suggest that Senate confirmation would reduce the independence of 
the Kansas Supreme Court.81  By contrast, bar groups have not charged that 
Senate confirmation of federal judges reduces the independence of federal 
unfit characters . . . .”  THE FEDERALIST No. 76 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 42.
78. In addition to deterring controversial nominations, the requirement of senate 
confirmation may also lead executives to withdraw controversial nominations.  Some suggest this 
is what led President Bush to withdraw Harriet Miers’ nomination to the Supreme Court.   See, 
e.g., John Cochran, A Troubled Nomination Implodes, CQ WKLY, Oct. 29, 2005. Similarly, in 
Connecticut, the 2006 nomination of an associate justice for chief justice was not put to a vote 
because the nominee withdrew his name. At least one commentator attributes the withdrawal in 
part to the prospect of a “grilling,” (i.e., “rough” questioning,) before the state senate.  See Lynne 
Tuohy, Court Saga Left Bruises, Balm, HARTFORD COURANT, Mar. 17, 2007, at A1.
79. “In the early nineteenth century, states switched to the election of judges in a fervor of 
Jacksonian democracy.”  DANIEL BECKER & MALIA REDDICK, JUDICIAL SELECTION REFORM:
EXAMPLES FROM SIX STATES 20 (2003), available at http://www.ajs.org/js/jsreform.pdf.  See 
also STUMPF & PAUL, supra note 36, at 134-35; JUDICIAL REFORM IN THE STATES 4-5 (Anthony 
Champagne & Judith Haydel eds., 1993).
80. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 49-52 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed. 1999) (for 
Madison’s classic distinction between republics and democracies).  The Framers “understood that 
despotism of the many could be as dangerous to government and to individual liberty as 
despotism of the few, and they designed their democracy to ensure against both evils.  The 
Framers’ fear of majority faction is evident: their constitution is countermajoritarian in numerous 
respects. The document clearly is founded in part on permitting and expecting the populace to 
speak through its elected representatives. By the same token, the Constitution is shot through with 
provisions that in effect might defeat the decisions of a popular majority.” Barry Friedman, 
Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REV. 577, 619-20 (1993) (footnotes omitted).
81. See, e.g., Memorandum from Jim Robinson to House Committee on the Judiciary (Feb. 
6, 2005), available at http://www.kadc.org/Testimony/Robinson_JudicialSelection.pdf (“Senate 
confirmation introduces a political element into the selection process that diminishes judicial 
independence.”).
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courts.  All seem to agree that federal judges enjoy a tremendous degree of 
independence because they have life tenure.82  By contrast, judges who are 
subject to reelection or reappointment have less independence because they are 
accountable to those with the power to reelect or reappoint them.  Judicial 
independence is primarily determined, not by the system of judicial selection, 
but by the system of judicial retention, including the length of a justice’s 
term.83
The current system of judicial retention for the Kansas Supreme Court is 
as follows.  When first appointed, a justice holds office for a short initial 
term.84  To remain on the bench, a justice must stand for retention at the next 
general election which occurs after one year in office and, if retained in that 
election, must stand for retention every six years thereafter.85  In these 
retention elections, the justice does not face an opposing candidate; instead, the 
voters’ choose simply to retain or reject that particular justice.86  A justice must 
retire at the end of the term during which the justice reaches the age of 70.87
This system of judicial retention is perfectly compatible with a judicial 
selection process that includes senate confirmation.  Three states combine 
retention elections with initial selection through confirmation by the senate or 
other publicly-elected officials.88  Accordingly, supporters of senate 
82. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“during good behaviour”).
83. “Life tenure acts to insulate justices from political pressure because, short of the drastic 
and difficult step of impeachment, justices cannot be removed from the Court for making 
unpopular decisions. Nonrenewable terms insulate justices in the same way.” James E. DiTullio 
& John B. Schochet, Note, Saving This Honorable Court: A Proposal to Replace Life Tenure on
the Supreme Court with Staggered, Nonrenewable Eighteen-Year Terms, 90 VA. L. REV. 1093, 
1127 (2004) (referring to the United States Supreme Court) (footnote omitted).  “Appointing 
justices to renewable terms, however, would move the Court in the direction of a legislative body 
and undermine judicial independence.” Id.  See also Presser et al., supra note 12, at 369-70; 
Behrens & Silverman, supra note 50, at 305 (“Life tenure, as Alexander Hamilton recognized, is 
the best means of assuring judicial independence. Short of life tenure, the longer the term, the 
greater the potential for judicial independence.”) (footnote omitted); Lee Epstein, et al., 
Comparing Judicial Selection Systems, 10 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 7, 12 (2001) (“[W]hile the 
U.S. Framers gave federal jurists life tenure presumably to maximize judicial independence, other 
nations opted for renewable terms presumably to maximize accountability.”).
84. KAN. CONST. art. 3 § 5(c) (A new justice “shall hold office for an initial term ending on 
the second Monday in January following the first general election that occurs after the expiration 
of twelve months in office. Not less than sixty days prior to the holding of the general election 
next preceding the expiration of his term of office, any justice of the supreme court may file in the 
office of the secretary of state a declaration of candidacy for election to succeed himself.”).
85. KAN. CONST. art. 3 §§ 2, 5(c).
86. Id.
87. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 20-2608(a) (2006) (“Any judge upon reaching age 75 shall retire, 
except that any duly elected or appointed justice of the supreme court shall retire upon reaching 
age 70. Upon retiring, each such judge as described in this subsection shall receive retirement 
annuities as provided in K.S.A. 20-2610 and amendments thereto, except, that when any justice 
of the supreme court attains the age of 70, such judge may, if such judge desires, finish serving 
the term during which such judge attains the age of 70.”).
88. These states are California, Maryland and Utah. See CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 16 
(retention election every 12 years), MD. CONST. art. IV, § 5A (retention election every 10 years), 
2- WARE                                                                     (DO NOT DELETE) 5/30/2008  3:38:20 PM
408 KANSAS JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. XVII:3
confirmation in Kansas argue that there is no need to change our state’s system 
of judicial retention.89  The balance Kansas has struck between judicial 
independence and judicial accountability is quite reasonable and well within 
the national mainstream.90  If, however, greater judicial independence was 
desired, Kansas could extend the length of a justice’s term (the time between 
retention elections) or even abolish retention elections altogether so justices 
could serve until reaching the mandatory retirement age.  On the other hand, if 
greater judicial accountability was desired then Kansas could reduce the length 
of a justice’s term.
VI. CONCLUSION
The bar has an unusually high degree of control over the selection of 
supreme court justices in Kansas.  None of the other forty nine states gives the 
bar as much control.  To move Kansas from this extreme position toward the 
mainstream, several possible reforms have been debated in recent years.  The 
least ambitious reform would merely change the composition of the Kansas 
Supreme Court Nominating Commission.  Rather than allowing the bar to 
select a majority of the Commission’s members, some of those members could, 
instead, be selected by the Kansas Legislature.  While this would reduce the 
amount of control the bar has over the judicial selection process, it would not 
open up the process by exposing the commissioners’ votes to the public.  Other 
states open the judicial selection process to the public by using judicial 
elections or senate confirmation of judicial nominees.  Proposals to elect 
supreme court justices have received little support in Kansas in recent years.  
By contrast, proposals to institute senate confirmation have received 
significant support in the Kansas Legislature.  Senate confirmation would both 
reduce the amount of control the bar has over the judicial selection process and 
open up that process to a more public system of checks and balances.  The 
worry that senate confirmation in Kansas would be a political “circus” or a 
“battle” finds little support in the experience of the many states that use senate 
UTAH CONST. art. VIII, § 9 (retention elections every ten years).
89. H.R. Con. Res. 5033 (Kan. 2006) and H.R. Con. Res. 5008 (Kan. 2007), which would 
move to the federal system of senate confirmation without a nominating commission, making no 
change to judicial retention except to eliminate the use of masculine pronouns.
90. See, e.g., Behrens & Silverman, supra note 50.
 Life tenure, as Alexander Hamilton recognized, is the best means of assuring 
judicial independence. Short of life tenure, the longer the term, the greater the 
potential for judicial independence. The public’s desire for accountability, 
however, necessitates some checks on appointed judges. Few states opt for a 
lifetime appointment system because the people or the political establishment 
want to be able to remove judges who lose sight of society's values. For this 
reason, most states with appointive systems set a full term of between four and 
twelve years.
Those states that use merit selection provide for nonpartisan retention elections 
that usually occur within one to two years of appointment and after each full term.
Id. at 305 (footnotes omitted).
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confirmation.  In short, senate confirmation of Kansas Supreme Justices is a 
reform worthy of serious consideration.
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Appendix A91
Kansas Supreme Court Appointments, 1987 - 2007
Allegrucci, Donald L., (D92) Pittsburg, appointed vice Schroeder, Jan. 12, 
1987 to Jan. 8, 2007.
 Governor John Carlin (D) [8 Jan 1979 – 12 Jan 1987]
 Supreme Court Nominating Commission:
o Robert C. Foulston [Chair, 1985 – 1992]93
o Aubrey G. Linville [First District Lawyer, 1983 – 1988]  (R)
o Donald Patterson [Second District Lawyer, 1979 – 1989]  (R)
o John E. Shamberg [Third District Lawyer, 1985 – 1993]  (D)
o Dennis L. Gillen [Fourth District Lawyer, 1986 – 1993]  (R)
o Morris D. Hildreth [Fifth District Lawyer, 1977 – 1987]94
o Bill Jellison [First District Non-Lawyer, 1983 – 1988]  (D95)
o Joan Adam [Second District Non-Lawyer, 1979 – 1989]  
(D96)
o Norman E. Justice [Third District Non-Lawyer, 1980 – 1990]  
(D97)
o John C. Oswald [Fourth District Non-Lawyer, 1981 – 1991]  
(D98)
o Kenneth D. Buchele [Fifth District Non-Lawyer, 1982 –
1987]  (D99)
 Co-Nominees:
o William Cook  (D100)
o Jerry Gill Elliott  (U101)
Six, Frederick N., (R102) Lawrence, appointed vice Prager, Sept. 1, 1988 to 
Jan. 13, 2003.
 Governor Mike Hayden (R) [12 Jan 1987 – 14 Jan 1991]
 Supreme Court Nominating Commission:
91 Unless noted otherwise, all party affiliations are derived from the Kansas VoterView database 
available at the Kansas Secretary of State website, https://myvoteinfo.voteks.org/.
92 Chris Grenz, Critics Question Democratic Majority on High Court, HUTCHINSON NEWS, Aug. 
9, 2005. 
93 Deceased.  No party affiliation available.
94 Deceased.  No party affiliation available.





100 Carlin Picks Allegrucci for Court, WICHITA EAGLE, Dec. 25, 1986, at 1A.
101 Id.  
102 Two Judges, Lawyer Nominated for Position on State High Court, WICHITA EAGLE, July 8, 
1988, at 4D.
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o Robert C. Foulston [Chair, 1985 – 1992]103
o Aubrey G. Linville [First District Lawyer, 1983 – 1988]  (R)
o Donald Patterson [Second District Lawyer, 1979 – 1989]  (R)
o John E. Shamberg [Third District Lawyer, 1985 – 1993]  (D)
o Dennis L. Gillen [Fourth District Lawyer, 1986 – 1993]  (R)
o Jack L. Lively [Fifth District Lawyer, 1987 – 1993]  (R)
o Bill Jellison [First District Non-Lawyer, 1983 – 1988]  (D104)
o Joan Adam [Second District Non-Lawyer, 1979 – 1989]  
(D105)
o Norman E. Justice [Third District Non-Lawyer, 1980 – 1990]  
(D106)
o John C. Oswald [Fourth District Non-Lawyer, 1981 – 1991]  
(D107)
o Betty Buller [Fifth District Non-Lawyer, 1987 – 1993]  (R)
 Co-Nominees:
o Bob Abbott  (R108)
o Charles Henson  (R109)
Abbott, Bob, (R110) Junction City, appointed vice Miller, Sept. 1, 1990 to June 
6, 2003.
 Governor Mike Hayden (R) [12 Jan 1987 – 14 Jan 1991]
 Supreme Court Nominating Commission:
o Robert C. Foulston [Chair, 1985 – 1992]111
o Selby S. Soward [First District Lawyer, 1988 – 1991]112
o Jerry R. Palmer [Second District Lawyer, 1989 – 1995]  (D)
o John E. Shamberg [Third District Lawyer, 1985 – 1993]  (D)
o Dennis L. Gillen [Fourth District Lawyer, 1986 – 1993]  (R)
o Jack L. Lively [Fifth District Lawyer, 1987 – 1993]  (R)
o Lon E. Pishny [First District Non-Lawyer, 1988 – 1993]  (R)
o Judith Nightingale [Second District Non-Lawyer, 1989 –
1993]  (R)
o Norman E. Justice [Third District Non-Lawyer, 1980 – 1990]  
(D113)
103 Deceased.  No party affiliation available.




108 Two Judges, supra note 102, at 4D.
109 Id.
110 Id.
111 Deceased.  No party affiliation available.
112 Deceased.  No party affiliation available.
113 GOV. CARLIN RECORDS, BOX 59-1-2-19.
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o John C. Oswald [Fourth District Non-Lawyer, 1981 – 1991]  
(D114)
o Betty Buller [Fifth District Non-Lawyer, 1987 – 1993]  (R)
 Co-Nominees:
o Joseph Pierron Jr.  (R115)
o Elwaine Pomeroy  (R116)
Davis, Robert E., (D117) Topeka, appointed vice Herd, Jan. 11, 1993—.
 Governor Joan Finney (D) [14 Jan 1991 – 9 Jan 1995]
 Supreme Court Nominating Commission:
o Jack E. Dalton [Chair, 1992 – 1993]  (R)
o Constance M. Achterberg [First District Lawyer, 1992 –
1993]  (R)
o Jerry R. Palmer [Second District Lawyer, 1989 – 1995]  (D)
o John E. Shamberg [Third District Lawyer, 1985 – 1993]  (D)
o Dennis L. Gillen [Fourth District Lawyer, 1986 – 1993]  (R)
o Jack L. Lively [Fifth District Lawyer, 1987 – 1993]  (R)
o Lon E. Pishny [First District Non-Lawyer, 1988 – 1993]  (R)
o Judith Nightingale [Second District Non-Lawyer, 1989 –
1993]  (R)
o Emmett J. Tucker, Jr. [Third District Non-Lawyer, 1990 –
1993]  (R)
o Evangeline S. Chavez [Fourth District Non-Lawyer, 1991 –
1993]  (D)
o Betty Buller [Fifth District Non-Lawyer, 1987 – 1993]  (R)
 Co-Nominees:
o Kay Royse  (D118)
o Franklin Theis  (D119)
Larson, Edward, (R) Hays, appointed vice Holmes, Sept. 1, 1995 to Sept. 4, 
2002.
 Governor Bill Graves (R) [9 Jan 1995 – 13 Jan 2003]
 Supreme Court Nominating Commission:
o Lynn R. Johnson [Chair, 1993 – 2001]  (D)
o Lowell F. Hahn [First District Lawyer, 1994 – 2002]  (R)
o Jerry R. Palmer [Second District Lawyer, 1989 – 1995]  (D)
114 Id.
115 Owen Case Given to Second Judge, HUTCHINSON NEWS, Nov. 7, 1989.
116 STATE OF KANSAS LEGISLATIVE DIRECTORY OF THE SEVENTIETH LEGISLATURE 1983
REGULAR SESSION.
117 Grenz, supra note 92.
118 Al Polczinski, Weigand Fights Rich-Guy Image, WICHITA EAGLE, May 25, 1990, at 3D.
119 Finney Fills Spot on State’s High Court, WICHITA EAGLE, Dec. 15, 1992, at 3D.
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o Patrick D. McAnany [Third District Lawyer, 1993 – 1995]  
(R)
o Arden J. Bradshaw [Fourth District Lawyer, 1993 – 1997]  
(D)
o Carolyn Bird [First District Non-Lawyer, 1993 – 1998]  (D) 
o Edwin Watson [Second District Non-Lawyer, 1993 – 1995]  
(D120)
o John Strick, Jr. [Third District Non-Lawyer, 1993 – 1996]  
(D)
o Pat Lehman [Fourth District Non-Lawyer, 1993 – 1997]  
(D121)
 Co-Nominees:
o Robert J. Lewis Jr.  (R)
o Steve A. Leben  (D)
Nuss, Lawton R., (R122) Salina, appointed vice Larson, Sept. 4, 2002—.
 Governor Bill Graves (R) [9 Jan 1995 – 13 Jan 2003]
 Supreme Court Nominating Commission:
o Richard C. Hite [Chair, 2001 – 2009]  (R)
o Lowell F. Hahn [First District Lawyer, 1994 – 2002]  (R)
o Thomas E. Wright [Second District Lawyer, 1995 – 2003]  
(D)
o Thomas J. Bath [Third District Lawyer, 2000 – 2008]  (R)
o Lee H. Woodard [Fourth District Lawyer, 2001 – 2009]  (D)
o Debbie L. Nordling [First District Non-Lawyer, 1998 – 2006]  
(R)
o James S. Maag [Second District Non-Lawyer, 2000 – 2003]  
(R)
o Suzanne S. Bond [Third District Non-Lawyer, 1996 – 2004]  
(R)
o Dennis L. Greenhaw [Fourth District Non-Lawyer, 1997 –
2005]  (R)
 Co-Nominees:
o Marla Luckert  (D123) 
o Warren M. McCamish  (R)
120 Telephone Interview by Christopher Steadham with Linda Chalfant, Atchison County, Kansas 
Clerk’s Office (Aug. 16, 2007).
121 Kansas Democratic Party, Announcing the Kansas Democratic Party Speakers Bureau, 
http://www.ksdp.org/node/1210 (last visited Aug. 16, 2007).
122 Grenz, supra note 92.
123 Id.
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Luckert, Marla J., (D124) Topeka, appointed vice Six, Jan. 13, 2003—.
 Governor Bill Graves (R) [9 Jan 1995 – 13 Jan 2003]
 Supreme Court Nominating Commission:
o Richard C. Hite [Chair, 2001 – 2009]  (R)
o David J. Rebein [First District Lawyer, 2002 – 2006]  (R125)
o Thomas E. Wright [Second District Lawyer, 1995 – 2003]  
(D)
o Thomas J. Bath [Third District Lawyer, 2000 – 2008]  (R)
o Lee H. Woodard [Fourth District Lawyer, 2001 – 2009]  (D)
o Debbie L. Nordling [First District Non-Lawyer, 1998 – 2006]  
(R)
o James S. Maag [Second District Non-Lawyer, 2000 – 2003]  
(R)
o Suzanne S. Bond [Third District Non-Lawyer, 1996 – 2004]  
(R)
o Dennis L. Greenhaw [Fourth District Non-Lawyer, 1997 –
2005]  (R)
 Co-Nominees:
o David L. Stutzman  (U126)
o Stephen D. Hill  (D127)
Gernon, Robert L., (R128) Topeka, appointed vice Lockett, Jan. 13, 2003 to 
March 30, 2005.
 Governor Bill Graves (R) [9 Jan 1995 – 13 Jan 2003]
 Supreme Court Nominating Commission:
o Richard C. Hite [Chair, 2001 – 2009]  (R)
o David J. Rebein [First District Lawyer, 2002 – 2006]  (R129)
o Thomas E. Wright [Second District Lawyer, 1995 – 2003]  
(D)
o Thomas J. Bath [Third District Lawyer, 2000 – 2008]  (R)
o Lee H. Woodard [Fourth District Lawyer, 2001 – 2009]  (D)
o Debbie L. Nordling [First District Non-Lawyer, 1998 – 2006]  
(R)
o James S. Maag [Second District Non-Lawyer, 2000 – 2003]  
(R)




126 Jim McLean, Appointed: Governor Tabs Shawnee County District Court Judge to Replace 
Retiring Justice Six, TOPEKA CAPITAL–JOURNAL, Nov. 21, 2002, at A1.
127 Id. 
128 Hayden to Pick Appeals Judge, WICHITA EAGLE, Oct. 31, 1987, at 15A.
129 Grenz, supra note 92.
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o Dennis L. Greenhaw [Fourth District Non-Lawyer, 1997 –
2005]  (R)
 Co-Nominees:
o Warren M. McCamish  (R)
o David L. Stutzman  (U130)
Beier, Carol A., (D131) Wichita, appointed vice Abbott, Sept. 5, 2003—.
 Governor Kathleen Sebelius (D) [13 Jan 2003 – present]
 Supreme Court Nominating Commission:
o Richard C. Hite [Chair, 2001 – 2009]  (R)
o David J. Rebein [First District Lawyer, 2002 – 2006]  (R132)
o Thomas E. Wright [Second District Lawyer, 1995 – 2003]  
(D)
o Thomas J. Bath [Third District Lawyer, 2000 – 2008]  (R)
o Lee H. Woodard [Fourth District Lawyer, 2001 – 2009]  (D)
o Debbie L. Nordling [First District Non-Lawyer, 1998 – 2006]  
(R)
o James S. Maag [Second District Non-Lawyer, 2000 – 2003]  
(R)
o Suzanne S. Bond [Third District Non-Lawyer, 1996 – 2004]  
(R)
o Dennis L. Greenhaw [Fourth District Non-Lawyer, 1997 –
2005]  (R)
 Co-Nominees:
o Steve A. Leben  (D)
o Patrick D. McAnany  (R)
Rosen, Eric S., (D133) Topeka, appointed vice Gernon, Nov. 18, 2005—.
 Governor Kathleen Sebelius (D) [13 Jan 2003 – present] 
 Supreme Court Nominating Commission:
o Richard C. Hite [Chair, 2001 – 2009]  (R)
o David J. Rebein [First District Lawyer, 2002 – 2006]  (R134)
o Patricia E. Riley [Second District Lawyer, 2003 – 2007]  (D)
o Thomas J. Bath [Third District Lawyer, 2000 – 2008]  (R)
o Lee H. Woodard [Fourth District Lawyer, 2001 – 2009]  (D)
o Debbie L. Nordling [First District Non-Lawyer, 1998 – 2006]  
(R)
130 McLean, supra note 126.   
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o Dale E. Cushinberry [Second District Non-Lawyer, 2003 –
2007]  (D)
o Vivien Jennings [Third District Non-Lawyer, 2004 – 2008]  
(D)
o Dennis L. Greenhaw [Fourth District Non-Lawyer, 1997 –
2005]  (R)
 Co-Nominees:
o Robert Fairchild  (R135)
o Martha Coffman  (D136)
Johnson, Lee A., (R137) Caldwell, appointed vice Allegrucci, Jan. 8, 2007—.
 Governor Kathleen Sebelius (D) [13 Jan 2003 – present]
 Supreme Court Nominating Commission:
o Richard C. Hite [Chair, 2001 – 2009]  (R)
o Kerry E. McQueen [First District Lawyer, 2006 – 2010]  (R)
o Patricia E. Riley [Second District Lawyer, 2003 – 2007]  (D)
o Thomas J. Bath [Third District Lawyer, 2000 – 2008]  (R)
o Lee H. Woodard [Fourth District Lawyer, 2001 – 2009]  (D)
o Janet A. Juhnke [First District Non-Lawyer, 2006 – 2010]  
(D)
o Dale E. Cushinberry [Second District Non-Lawyer, 2003 –
2007]  (D)
o Vivien Jennings [Third District Non-Lawyer, 2004 – 2008]  
(D)
o David N. Farnsworth [Fourth District Non-Lawyer, 2005 –
2009]  (D)
 Co-Nominees:
o Robert Fairchild  (R138)
o Tom Malone  (D139)
135 Chris Moon, Local Judge a Finalist, TOPEKA CAPITAL – JOURNAL, May 25, 2005, at B1.  
136 Id. 
137 Tim Carpenter, Appeals Court Judge Named to High Court, TOPEKA CAPITAL – JOURNAL, 
Jan. 6, 2007, at 1A.  
138 Moon, supra note 135.  
139 Nickie Flynn, GOP Rivals for Judgeship are Old Allies, WICHITA EAGLE, July 31, 1992, at 
3D.
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Appendix B
Most Recent State Supreme Court Confirmation Votes140
State Nominee Governor Confirm Vote tally
CT141 Justice Peter T. Zarella John G. Rowland Y (Senate:35-1; 
House: 136-0, 
14 absent or not 
voting)
CT Chief Justice Chase T. 
Rogers
M. Jodi Rell Y (Senate: 33-0, 
3 absent or not 
voting; 
House: 149-0, 2 
absent or not voting)
DE142 Justice Jack Jacobs Ruth Ann Minner Y (19-0, 2 absent or not 
voting)
DE Justice Henry DuPont 
Ridgely
Ruth Ann Minner Y (21-0)
HI143 Justice James E. Duffy Linda Lingle Y (25-0)





MA144 Justice Robert J. Cordy Paul Cellucci Y (8-0, vacancy on the 
Council at the time)
MA Justice Judith Cowin Paul Celluci Y (9-0)
MD145 Justice Clayton Greene Jr. Robert Ehrlich Y (45-0, 2 absent)
MD Justice Lynne Battaglia Parris N. 
Glendening
Y (40-3, 4 absent)
ME146 Justice Andrew M. Mead John Baldacci Y (33-0, with 2 
members absent; 13-
0, in judiciary 
committee)
ME Justice Warren M. Silver John E. Baldacci Y (30-0, with 5 
140. This Appendix reports the two most recent supreme court confirmation votes prior to 
August 1, 2007 in the states that have such votes.  The votes reported are for the state’s highest 
court regardless of whether or not it is named “the supreme court.”  The votes reported are the last 
two votes for initial supreme court confirmation, rather than retention or elevation of an associate 
justice to chief justice. In Connecticut, the 2006 nomination of an associate justice for chief 
justice was not put to a vote because the nominee asked to have his name withdrawn.  See supra
note 74 (citing Lynne Tuohy, Court Saga Left Bruises, Balm, HARTFORD COURANT, Mar. 17, 
2007, at A1).
141. Interview by Beth Dorsey with Legislative Library, Conn. Gen. Assembly (Aug. 14, 
2007), available at www.cga.ct.gov/.
142. Interview by Beth Dorsey with Bernard Brady, Sec’y of the Senate, Del. Gen. 
Assembly (Aug. 16, 2007).
143. Interview by Beth Dorsey with Pub. Access Room, Haw. State Legislature (Aug. 16, 
2007).
144. Email from Ethan Tavan, Constituent Services Aide, Office of the Governor, Mass. to 
Beth Dorsey, Research Assistant to Professor Stephen J. Ware, University of Kansas School of 
Law (July 30, 2007).
145. Letter from Marilyn McManus, Dept. of Legislative Serv., Office of Policy Analysis, 
Md. Gen. Assembly to Beth Dorsey, Research Assistant to Professor Stephen J. Ware, University 
of Kansas School of Law (Aug. 16, 2007).
146. Email from Mark Knierim, Reference Librarian, Me. State Law and Legislative 
Reference Library to Beth Dorsey, Research Assistant to Professor Stephen J. Ware, University 
of Kansas School of Law (July 30, 2007).
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members absent; 12-
0, with 1 absent in 
judiciary committee)
NH147 Justice Gary E. Hicks John Lynch Y (5-0)
NH Justice Richard E. Galway Craig Benson Y (5-0)
NJ148 Justice Helen E. Hoens Jon S. Corzine Y (35-0, 2 members did 
not vote)
NJ149 Chief Justice Stuart Rabner Jon S. Corzine Y (36-1, dissenting vote 
Senator Nia Gill)
NY150 Justice Eugene F. Pigott, Jr. George E. Pataki Y (no tally available -
confirmed by voice 
vote) 
NY Justice Theodore T. Jones Eliot Spitzer Y (no tally available –
confirmed by voice 
vote)
RI151 Justice P. Robinson III Donald L. Carcieri Y (House: 65-5, 5 
absent or not voting; 
Senate: 37-0, 1 
absent or not voting)
RI Justice Paul A. Suttell Donald L. Carcieri Y (House: 65-0, 10 
absent or not voting; 
Senate: 30-0, 8 
absent or not voting)
UT152 Justice Jill N. Parrish Michael O. Leavitt Y (28-0, 1 absent)
UT Justice Ronald E. Nehring Michael O. Leavitt Y (27-1, 1 absent)
VT153 Justice Brian L. Burgess James H. Douglas Y (29-0, 1 absent or not 
voting)
VT Chief Justice Paul L. 
Reiber
James H. Douglas Y (27-0, 3 absent or not 
voting)
147. Email from Raymond S. Burton, Member of the N.H. Executive Council to Beth 
Dorsey, Research Assistant to Professor Stephen J. Ware, University of Kansas School of Law 
(Aug. 4, 2007).
148. Email from James G. Wilson, Assistant Legislative Counsel, Office of Legislative 
Services, N.J. State Legislature to Beth Dorsey, Research Assistant to Professor Stephen J. Ware, 
University of Kansas School of Law (Aug. 7, 2007).
149. Email from Legislative and Info. and Bill Room, Office of Legislative Services, N.J. 
State Legislature to Beth Dorsey, Research Assistant to Professor Stephen J. Ware, University of 
Kansas School of Law (July 30, 2007).
150. Interview by Beth Dorsey with Legislative Journal Room, N.Y. Assembly (Aug. 25, 
2007).  Interview by Beth Dorsey with Liz Carr, N.Y. Governor’s Office (Sept. 12, 2007).
151. Interview by Beth Dorsey with R.I. Legislative Library, R.I. State Legislature (Aug. 
15, 2007).
152. Interview by Beth Dorsey with Shelley Day, Legislative Info. Liaison, Utah State 
Legislature Research Library and Information Center (Aug. 24, 2003).  See also 
http://le.utah.gov/.
153. Email from Michael Chernick, Legislative Council, Vt. State Legislature to Beth 
Dorsey, Research Assistant to Professor Stephen J. Ware, University of Kansas School of Law 
(Aug. 15, 2007).
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I.   The Preferred System of Judicial Selection
•The Commission recommends, as the preferred system of state court 
judicial selection, a commission-based appointive system with the 
following components:
•The Commission recommends that the governor appoint judges from a 
pool of judicial aspirants whose qualifications have been reviewed and 
approved by a credible, neutral, nonpartisan, diverse deliberative body 
or commission.
•The Commission recommends that judicial appointees serve a single, 
lengthy term of at least 15 years or until a specified age and not be 
subject to a reselection process.154  Judges so appointed should be entitled 
to retirement benefits upon completion of judicial service.
•The Commission recommends that judges not otherwise subject to 
reselection, nonetheless, remain subject to regular judicial performance 
evaluations and disciplinary processes that include removal for 
misconduct.
The American Bar Association has long supported appointive-
based or so-called “merit selection” systems for the selection of state 
judges, and in the Commission’s view, rightly so, for several reasons. 
First, the administration of justice should not turn on the outcome of 
popularity contests.  If we accept the enduring principles identified in 
the first section of this report, then a good judge is a competent and 
conscientious lawyer with a judicial temperament who is independent 
enough to uphold the law impartially without regard to whether the 
results will be politically popular with voters. Second, initial 
appointment reduces the corrosive influence of money in judicial 
selection by sparing candidates the need to solicit contributions from 
individuals and organizations with an interest in the cases the 
candidates will decide as judges. Some argue that in appointive 
systems, campaign contributions are simply redirected from judicial 
candidates to the appointing governors, but that is an important 
difference because it is the money that flows directly from 
contributors to judicial candidates that gives rise to a perception of 
dependence. Third, the escalating cost of running judicial campaigns 
operates to exclude from the pool of viable candidates those of limited 
financial means who lack access to contributors with significant 
financial resources. The potential impact of this development on 
efforts to diversify the bench is especially troublesome.  Fourth, the 
prospect of soliciting contributions from special interests and being 
154. The American Bar Association House of Delegates adopted a recommendation stating, 
“Judicial appointees should serve until a specified age.”
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publicly pressured to take positions on issues they must later decide as 
judges threatens to discourage many capable and qualified people from 
seeking judicial office. For these and other reasons upon which the 
ABA has relied in the past, the Commission believes that judges 
should initially be selected by appointment.
Consistent with an earlier recommendation in this Report, the 
Commission likewise recommends that an independent deliberative 
body evaluate the qualifications of all judicial aspirants and that 
candidates eligible for nomination to judicial office be limited to those 
who have been approved by such a body. In grounding its support for 
appointive judiciaries on the principle that the viability of a would-be 
judge’s candidacy should not turn on her or his political popularity, 
the Commission does not mean to suggest that appointive systems are 
apolitical. Any method of judicial selection will inevitably be political 
because judges decide issues of intense social, cultural, economic, and 
political interest to the public and the other branches of government. 
In this inherently political environment, however, the requirement that 
independent commissions review the qualifications of and approve all 
would-be judges provides a safety net to assure that all nominees 
possess the baseline capabilities, credentials, and temperament needed 
to be excellent judges.
Despite the occasional tendency to regard “politics” as a bad 
word, at its root, politics refers to the process by which citizens 
govern themselves. In that regard, it is not only inevitable but also 
perhaps even desirable that judicial selection have a “political” aspect 
to ensure that would-be judges are acceptable to the people they serve. 
Because judges, by virtue of their need to remain independent and 
impartial, serve a role in government that is fundamentally different 
from that of other public officials, the Commission has recommended 
against the use of elections as a means to ensure public acceptability.
The Commission did, however, consider another possibility: 
legislative confirmation of gubernatorial appointments. Requiring that 
judges be approved by an independent commission and both political 
branches of government could conceivably increase public confidence 
in the judges at the point of initial selection and serve as a form of 
prospective accountability that reduces the need for resorting to more 
problematic reselection processes later. A majority of the Commission 
ultimately decided, however, not to recommend legislative 
confirmation as a component of its preferred selection system. The 
protracted and combative confirmation process in the federal system, 
coupled with the highly politicized relationship between governors and 
legislators in many states, has led the Commission not to recommend 
such an approach.
The last of the Commission’s recommendations with respect to the 
selection system it regards as optimal is that states not employ 
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reselection processes. Discussions of judicial selection often overlook 
a distinction that the Commission regards as absolutely critical, 
between initial selection and reselection. When nonincumbents run for 
judicial office in contested elections, the threat that elections pose to 
their future independence and impartiality—though extant—is limited. 
Granted, nonincumbent candidates can be made to appear beholden 
either to their contributors, to positions they took on the campaign 
trail, or more generally to the electoral majority responsible for 
selecting them. But unlike incumbent judges, first-time judicial office 
seekers are not at risk of being removed from office because they 
made rulings of law that did not sit well with voters.
A similar point can be made with respect to judges initially 
selected by appointment. The process by which those candidates are 
first chosen may be partisan and political, and some judges may feel a 
lingering allegiance to whoever appointed them. But they are not put 
in danger of losing jobs they currently hold on account of judicial 
decisions made in those positions.
In the Commission’s view, the worst selection-related judicial 
independence problems arise in the context of judicial reselection. It is 
then that judges who have declared popular laws unconstitutional, 
rejected constitutional challenges to unpopular laws, upheld the claims 
of unpopular litigants, or rejected the claims of popular litigants are 
subject to loss of tenure as a consequence. And it is then that judges 
may feel the greatest pressure to do what is politically popular rather 
than what the law requires. Public confidence in the courts is, in turn, 
undermined to the extent that judicial decisions made in the shadow of 
upcoming elections are perceived—rightly or wrongly—as motivated 
by fear of defeat.
The problems with reselection may be most common in contested 
reelection campaigns but are at risk of occurring in any reselection 
process—electoral or otherwise. Thus, for example, the issue arises in 
states that delegate the task of judicial reselection to legislatures, 
whose enactments judges are to interpret and, if unconstitutional, 
invalidate. For that reason, the Commission recommends against resort 
to reselection processes.
While the Commission recommends that judges be appointed to 
the bench without the possibility of subsequent reappointment, 
reelection, or retention election, the Commission has remained flexible 
as to the optimal length of a judge’s term of office. Most states that 
appoint judges without the possibility of subsequent reselection cap 
judicial terms at a specified age. States could also set judicial terms at 
a fixed number of years. In either case, however, it is important that 
states take pains to preserve judicial retirement benefits because 
judicial office will lose its appeal to the best and brightest lawyers if 
judges are obligated to conclude judicial service before their 
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retirement benefits vest.
If states opt for a single term, it is important that the term be of 
considerable length—at least fifteen or more years—for several 
reasons. First, there are obvious advantages that flow from experience 
on the bench that will be lost if judges are confined to short terms of 
office. Second, the most qualified candidates for judge will often be 
lawyers with very successful private practices that they may be 
reluctant to abandon if they are obligated to return to practice after 
only a few years on the bench. Third, to the extent that lawyers view 
judicial service as the culmination of their legal careers and not simply 
as a temporary detour from private practice, short terms may 
discourage younger lawyers from seeking judicial office. Fourth, 
insofar as judges are obligated to reenter the job market at the 
conclusion of their judicial service, their independence from 
prospective employers who appear before them as lawyers and 
litigants in the waning years of their judicial terms may become a 
concern.
In earlier recommendations, the Commission urged that systems 
of judicial discipline be actively enforced and that regular and 
comprehensive judicial evaluation programs be instituted. These 
recommendations are critically important to ensuring accountability in 
a system that does not rely on reselection processes. All states have 
procedures for judicial removal, typically including but not limited to 
those subsumed by the disciplinary process.
The Commission believes that judges must be removable for cause 
to preserve the institutional legitimacy of the courts. It is beyond the 
scope of this report to describe in detail the nature and extent of “for 
cause” removal. By way of general guidance, however, the 
Commission points to the enduring principles discussed in the first 
part of this report. An overriding goal of our system of justice is to 
uphold the rule of law. Judges should never be subject to removal for 
upholding the law as they construe it to be written, even when they are 
in error, for then the judge’s decision-making independence—so 
essential to safeguarding the rule of law in the long run—will be 
undermined. On the other hand, we do not want judges who are so 
independent that they are utterly unaccountable to the rule of law they 
have sworn to uphold.  Thus, judges who disregard the rule of law 
altogether by taking bribes or committing other crimes that undermine 
public confidence in the courts should be removed. One could reach a 
similar conclusion with respect to judges who, despite the best efforts 
of nominating commissions to weed out unqualified candidates, 
manifest an utter lack of the competence, character, or temperament 
requisite to upholding the law impartially.
